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Abstract:  
In Miller; McFarlane it was suggested that in financial remedy applications the 
guiding principle of fairness has three strands: needs, compensation and sharing. Each of 
these strands was said to be related to the parties' relationship, either causally or 
temporally. The ideas of causal and temporal connection have been neglected in subsequent 
case law. It is suggested that exploring them may provide a new way of thinking about financial 
remedy cases. Understanding the various rationales for allowing claims based on causal and 
temporal connections reveals something about the nature of marriage and the different ways that it 
is conceptualised in English law. The idea of causal and temporal connections is also valuable in 
providing a framework for thinking about those cases in which there are delays in bringing a financial 
remedy claim.  
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In England and Wales, financial remedy case law has long been concerned with providing an 
objective for the division of assets between a couple on divorce.  Judges have a wide discretion in 
reaching a result, guided by a statutory list of factors in Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25.  However, 
the judge operating under s 25 has been likened to a bus driver who is given a set of instructions 
about how to drive a bus but not told his destination.1  White v White2 marked perhaps the clearest 
change of direction in recent years.  Rather than simply providing the homemaker with sufficient to 
meet his or her needs and leaving the breadwinner with any surplus remaining after needs have 
been met, judges were directed to achieve a fair result and to divide the assets in a way that did not 
discriminate on the basis of who earned the money.  This change of direction, particularly important 
for the outcomes in high value cases, was further refined by Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane,3 
which made clear that fairness had three strands: needs, compensation and sharing.  
 
Thus judges applying s 25 must now aim to achieve a result that meets needs, compensates for 
relationship generated disadvantage and ensures a fair sharing of the fruits of the marital 
partnership. These three principles start from very different underlying premises. Need is ‘a very 
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broad concept with no single definition in family law’.4 In so-called big money cases, the sums 
required to meet need can be significant. However, in most cases, the key needs are for housing and 
income.5 The requirement to meet need has been justified on the basis of the interdependence that 
is typical in marriage.6 Sharing is an entitlement-based principle which views both parties as being 
entitled to share the matrimonial property by virtue of the partnership. Finally, compensation is 
concerned with the extent to which one party has suffered detriment as a result of the relationship. 
The ideas of needs, compensation and sharing have themselves been explored further by subsequent 
case law. The idea of compensation is far from universally popular7 and the precise meaning of 
‘needs’ is often a matter of contention. However, case law following Miller; McFarlane8 has done 
little to clarify the theoretical underpinning of these concepts.   
 
In Miller; McFarlane itself, Baroness Hale explained the rationale for the redistribution of assets 
between spouses as follows: 
 
‘In my view there are at least three. Any or all of them might supply such a reason, although 
one must be careful to avoid double counting. The cardinal feature is that each is looking at 
factors which are linked to the parties' relationship, either causally or temporally, and not to 
extrinsic, unrelated factors, such as a disability arising after the marriage has ended.’9 
 
Exploring the ideas of causal and temporal connections may provide a new way of thinking about 
financial remedy case law. Understanding the various rationales for allowing claims based on causal 
and temporal connections in the case law reveals something about the nature of marriage and the 
different ways that it is conceptualised in English law. The idea of causal and temporal connections is 
also valuable in providing a framework for thinking about those cases in which there are delays in 
bringing a financial remedy claim. Such cases raise concerns about the balance to be struck between 
ensuring that each spouse receives their fair share of the matrimonial property and is compensated 
appropriately for relationship generated disadvantage and the concern that a spouse may remain the 
insurer for their former partner long after their relationship ends (something that is also a concern in 
variation of maintenance case law).  The case of Wyatt v Vince10 and the forthcoming appeal in Mills 
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v Mills11 have recently brought this issue into sharp relief. When combined with legal aid cuts, which 
potentially reduce the ability of spouses to bring financial remedy claims at the point of divorce, this 
issue may assume greater prominence in years to come.  
 
What are causal and temporal connections? 
 
Broadly speaking, causal connections are concerned with whether a relationship is in some way 
responsible for creating a financial claim, whereas temporal connections are simply concerned with 
the time at which the source of the unmet need for which provision is sought arose and, specifically, 
whether it arose during the relationship.  Whereas casual connections are relatively uncontroversial 
as a basis for financial remedy, temporal connections are less universally accepted.  This is reflected 
in two different schools of thought about the basis for temporal claims in the case law, which each 
suggest a different concept of marriage and the obligations it generates.  
 
The first, pragmatist view, considers that responsibility for temporal claims cannot be theoretically 
justified but is instead a utilitarian device to pin what should otherwise be state responsibility on an 
individual, and that the notion of interpersonal obligation has been ‘distorted’12: 
 
‘For my part I find it difficult to see why it is just and reasonable that an ex-husband should 
have to pay spousal maintenance or enhanced spousal maintenance by reference to factors 
which are not causally connected to the marriage, unless one is looking at the issue in a 
macro-economic utilitarian way and deciding that in such circumstances it is better that the 
ex-husband picks up the cost of the ex-wife's support rather than the hard-pressed taxpayer. 
This, again, is a matter of social policy. But I would suggest that in such a case spousal 
maintenance payments should only be awarded to alleviate significant hardship.’13 
 
This view of marriage suggests that marriage is akin to a contractual relationship between two 
autonomous individuals. On this view, it might be argued that each spouse should be responsible for 
his or her own support after divorce, to the extent that any needs are not causally connected to the 
marriage. Indeed, in a very different social context with far greater state support, it is this view of 
spouses as ‘capable and independent individuals’14 that underpins the provisions in the Swedish 
Marriage Code that require each spouse to be responsible for his or her own support following 
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divorce.15 Whilst Sweden has a far more generous welfare state than England and Wales, the 
pragmatist view does not necessarily require this. It is equally consistent with a ‘liberal’ welfare state 
where ‘[e]ntitlement rules are… strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically 
modest’16 or a social democratic regime, like Sweden, in which ideas of ‘universalism’17 underline 
state benefits and the aim is ‘to promote and equality of the highest standards.’18 The concern of the 
pragmatist view is simply about where the ultimate theoretical responsibility lies for meeting needs.  
Joanna Miles19 suggests that there are three levels of responsibility: local responsibility for yourself, 
the horizontal responsibility of individuals in (or who were in) a domestic relationship, and the 
vertical responsibility of the state. The pragmatist view suggests that following a relationship, 
responsibility is primarily individual. However, if the individual cannot support him or herself alone 
then the responsibility is vertical (state) and not horizontal (spouse). If the pragmatist view is taken in 
a jurisdiction such as England and Wales, with a ‘liberal’ welfare state, there is the potential for the 
financially weaker party to end up in a precarious financial position.  
 
By contrast, the second view of temporal connections, the principled view, considers that claims 
based on temporal connections alone are justified. This view rests on the idea that the function 
marriage performs, and the interdependency inherent within it, provides the basis for both causally 
and temporally based claims against a former spouse. This view can be seen in Lord Nicholls’ speech 
in Miller; McFarlane: 
 
‘… to greater or lesser extent every relationship of marriage gives rise to a relationship of 
interdependence. The parties share the roles of money-earner, home-maker and child-carer. 
Mutual dependence begets mutual obligations of support. When the marriage ends fairness 
requires that the assets of the parties should be divided primarily so as to make provision for 
the parties' housing and financial needs, taking into account a wide range of matters such as 
the parties' ages, their future earning capacity, the family's standard of living, and any 
disability of either party. Most of these needs will have been generated by the marriage, but 
not all of them. Needs arising from age or disability are instances of the latter.’20 
 
On this view, marriage is not seen as a contractual-style relationship between two autonomous 
individuals, but rather a relationship of dependence or interdependence. The parties rely upon one 
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another and make decisions for the good of the unit that are not necessarily in their own individual 
best interests. As Anne Barlow explains: 
 
‘Marriage is typically an economic as well as an emotional relationship involving financial 
dependency or inter-dependency, especially where there are children.  One spouse will often 
make financial sacrifices by giving up their job or taking part-time work in order to care for 
children or elderly relatives; or perhaps to fit in with the demands of the other spouse’s 
career for the benefit of the family as the whole.’21 
 
Whereas the financial sacrifices involved in caring for children are examples of a causal connection, 
as discussed further below caring for elderly relatives is best seen as being temporally connected to 
the marriage.  The theme that unites them both is interdependence.  Such interdependence can have 
very real impacts on the future ability of spouses to support themselves. The available data 
demonstrate this particularly clearly in the context of childcare responsibilities, where women, and 
mothers in particular, tend to be financially worse off following separation.22 Often this is because of 
the way in which parents divide childcare responsibilities between them. Women still undertake the 
majority of unpaid work. In 2012, a British Social Attitude Survey found that on average women 
undertook 13 hours of housework and 23 hours of caring for the family compared with 8 and 10 
hours respectively for men.23 ONS data from 2016 suggests a similar split: women's unpaid work 
totalled 25.54 hours per week as compared to 15.99 hours for men, with women undertaking 4.67 
hours of childcare for men's 1.89 hours per week.24 When it comes to paid work, women are far 
more likely to work part-time. Around 42% of women work part-time as compared with 12% of 
men.25 This division of work is reflected in attitudes to childcare and employment, which still suggest 
that childcare is primarily a mother’s role. Seventy-six percent of respondents to the British Social 
Attitude Survey in 2012 suggested that women should stay at home or work part-time where a child 
is under school age.26 Where children are of school age, 52% of respondents still considered that a 
woman should work part-time and only 28% favoured full-time work.27 Options involving both 
parents working full time, both parents working part-time, or the father staying at home or working 
part-time while the mother works full-time were unpopular (favoured by 4%, 5% and less than 1% 
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respectively).28 Where one parent has an established earning capacity and the other’s career has 
been balanced with child-care responsibilities, an equal division does not mean an equal result. 
 
The costs associated with childcare tend to arise because of the sorts of decisions that Barlow29 
describes: giving up a job or working part-time.  If the cause of those sacrifices is instead caring for 
elderly relatives or a spouse who has become disabled, rather than children, that does not affect the 
motivation for or the costs of the decision.  Either way, the reason is the interdependence inherent in 
marriage and the cost is to the caring party’s ability to support herself or himself into the future.  
 
The view of marriage reflected in case law such as Miller; McFarlane30 recognises the reality of 
dependency and interdependency inherent in marriage and this is to be preferred to the pragmatic 
approach. Families make the joint decisions Barlow describes above for the functioning of the family 
as a whole, rather than for their own benefit. To take a purely causal approach to financial provision 
in this context seems overly commercial and simplistic. If one partner is made redundant during the 
marriage, then it is unlikely that the other would refuse to support them because the link is temporal 
only. A spouse might not choose to support their former partner in these circumstances at the point 
of divorce, but this does not mean that it is illegitimate for the law to impose such an obligation. For 
example, in such cases periodical payments could be made for a short time for the purpose of 
enabling a transition to independence.  In seeking to locate the justification for such orders, as 
discussed further below, there is a balance to be struck between properly recognising dependence 
and treating an ex-spouse as insurer indefinitely.  
 
Exploring causal and temporal connections 
 
There are four possible combinations of causal and temporal connections: 
 
1. Causal and temporal  
For example, where both parties agree that one of them should give up work during the 
marriage to care for their children. This was the case, for example, in Miller; McFarlane. 
2. Causal but not temporal  
For example, where, following the end of the marriage, a child becomes very ill and one 
parent gives up work to care for them.  
3. Temporal but not causal  
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An example cited in the case law31 is where a party has given up work during the marriage to 
care for elderly parents. This issue is discussed further below. 
4. Neither temporal nor causal  
For example, where a spouse suffers a disability after the end of the marriage. This situation 
was described as an 'extrinsic, unrelated factor' by Baroness Hale in Miller; McFarlane. 
 
These examples are illustrative of the differences between causal and temporal connections, but 
they, and recent case law, leave a number of questions unanswered. First, what is required for a 
causal connection? The first example above of giving up work to care for children seems to be a 
widely accepted causal link in the case law, but it is not entirely clear what exactly about these facts 
provides the causal link.  Is it the legal connection of the parents to the children? Or is it the joint 
decision that creates the causal link? In Miller; McFarlane, Baroness Hale said this about the 
justification for one party being required to meet the needs of the other: 
 
‘The most common source of need is the presence of children, whose welfare is always the 
first consideration, or of other dependent relatives, such as elderly parents. But another 
source of need is having had to look after children or other family members in the past… A 
further source of need may be the way in which the parties chose to run their life together. 
All couples throughout their lives together have to make choices about who will do what, 
sometimes forced upon them by circumstances such as redundancy or low pay, sometimes 
freely made in the interests of them both. The needs generated by such choices are a 
perfectly sound rationale for adjusting the parties' respective resources in compensation.’32 
 
This allows for the possibility that it is the joint decision which creates the causal link. However, it 
appears from the judgment in Waudby v Aldhouse,33 discussed further below, that counsel for the 
wife sought to rely upon Baroness Hale’s reference to elderly parents as an indication that a causal 
link was not always required. It is certainly possible to take this view.  Whereas caring for the children 
of both parties clearly has a causal link to the relationship, caring for elderly parents, particularly 
one’s own, is less clearly causally connected. On this interpretation, the justification for an award 
would be the temporal connection to the marriage and the idea of a causal connection is more 
narrowly drawn.  It is, however, possible to see the causal link not in the person to whom the care is 
being provided but in the joint choices made during the course of the relationship.  If this view is 
taken then it creates complexities for the case of caring for elderly parents. Whilst caring for one’s 
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spouse’s elderly parents is perhaps less controversial as a basis for then claiming financial relief on 
divorce in relation to unmet future needs arising from having adopted that caring role (it is highly 
unlikely that this would happen in the absence of the relationship), it is perhaps harder to see the 
decision to care for your own parents in this light. It is certainly arguable that a joint decision could 
be taken into account, but it is also the case that the action might have been taken with or without 
the relationship and with or without the joint decision. It may, therefore, be conceptually clearer to 
see this an example of a need that is temporally connected to the relationship.  
 
The question then arises whether it is better to adopt a broader approach to the idea of causal 
connection based on the idea of joint choices (and so to ground arguments for support in these cases 
on that ostensibly stronger basis), rather than to base claims merely on a temporal connection. As 
discussed further below, being able to construe a claim for financial relief as based on a causal rather 
than merely temporal connection tend to improve the position of the would-be payee. Not only are 
they less controversial than claims based only on a temporal connection, because they are consistent 
with both conceptions of marriage, but they seem to survive a delay in bringing a claim in a way that 
merely temporal connections do not. On the flip side, Lord Nicholls’ examples of age and disability 
outlined at the outset are clearly not envisaged as being causally connected to the marriage.34 The 
example of caring for your own parents is also problematic. Therefore, unless claims were simply 
allowed on utilitarian grounds, there would be no possibility of making a claim in such circumstances. 
This does not mean that all claims brought on the basis of a temporal connection will automatically 
succeed; the court is ultimately looking for a result that is fair between the parties in undertaking the 
discretionary exercise. This means balancing the competing interests of the parties and might 
involve, for example, looking at the extent to which the decision was reasonable within the context 
of the parties’ relationship. To exclude the possibility of bringing temporal claims altogether is unduly 
limiting within the context of a relationship of interdependence.  
 
The second question to consider in relation to causal and temporal connections is how these 
rationales fit with the ideas of needs, compensation and sharing. In line with the preceding 
discussion, it might be possible to argue that needs must be causally connected to the relationship. 
However, as the case law stands at present, needs may justify a claim if they are causally or 
temporally connected to the relationship. In contrast, compensation claims are causal: they are ‘tied 
closely to the functioning of the marriage, the decisions the parties made, the contributions and 
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associated sacrifices made’.35 In Miller, McFarlane Lord Nicholls, for example, describes the 
principle’s aim as being to redress ‘any significant prospective economic disparity between the 
parties arising from the way they conducted their marriage’.36 Baroness Hale takes a similar view, 
considering that compensation is ‘for relationship-generated disadvantage’.37  
 
Sharing claims are different. They arise because of the nature of marriage as ‘a partnership of 
equals’.38 It is, therefore, arguable that sharing claims necessarily have a causal connection to the 
relationship. It is, however, conceptually easier to think of sharing claims separately, because they 
focus on the partnership rationale for dividing matrimonial property, rather than being concerned 
with the needs of, or losses suffered by, either party.    
 
Causal and temporal links and the impact of delay 
 
Several recent cases have considered the impact of a delay in bringing a financial claim. For example, 
in Waudby v Aldhouse39 the delay between divorce and the application for financial remedy was 20 
years. Similarly, in Wyatt v Vince40 it was 18 years. More recently in Briers v Briers41 the Court of 
Appeal considered a much shorter, but still relatively significant, delay of 8 years. In all three cases, 
the delay featured in the courts’ reasoning. Does the impact of delay differ when a claim is based on 
a causal connection as opposed to a merely temporal connection and, if so, how?  
 
Needs cases 
 
The recent cases of Wyatt42 and Waudby43 both involved financial remedy applications brought some 
time after the end of the marriage.  In both cases, at the time the parties separated there was no 
marital acquest to be divided.  While both cases offer some support for the necessity of a causal 
connection in financial remedy proceedings where there has been a delay in bringing a financial 
claim, neither engaged with the issue directly.   
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Wyatt was the much publicised Supreme Court case in which the husband (the founder of Ecotricity) 
applied to strike out the wife’s claim for financial remedy brought 22 years after their divorce.  The 
Supreme Court refused to strike out the wife’s case and listed it for trial. Whilst the court did not, 
therefore, determine the wife’s application for financial remedy, some of the reasoning is of interest 
to the question of causal and temporal connections. Lord Wilson stressed that there was no time 
limit for making claims for financial remedy but that there ‘is a prominent strain of public policy 
hostile to forensic delay’.44 The court would look at the reasons for the delay and it might result in 
reduced provision being made to the applicant.45 Lord Wilson also emphasised the importance of a 
causal connection in cases where there had been a delay in bringing a financial remedy claim: 
 
‘In order to sustain a case of need, at any rate if made after many years of separation, a wife 
must show not only that the need exists but that it has been generated by her relationship 
with her husband.’46 
 
Waudby47 concerned the wife’s application for financial remedy, brought 20 years after the date of 
separation.  At first instance, she was awarded a lump sum of £10,000 and a joint-lives periodical 
payments order of £9,576 per annum on a needs basis.  The appeal turned on the first instance 
judge’s exercise of discretion. HHJ Rogers considered that the most troubling point was ‘the causal 
link between the relationship and need’. The judge at first instance held the husband responsible for 
the wife’s ongoing health difficulties.  HHJ Rogers found that the judge at first instance had ignored 
key factors that contradicted her assessment. He had difficulty in finding a causal connection 
between the wife’s need and the marital relationship. Interestingly, HHJ Rogers did not investigate 
the question of whether a causal connection was a necessary ingredient in the wife’s needs claim: 
‘plainly the Deputy Judge regarded it as a necessary ingredient. For my part, I do not regard the 
theoretical availability of such a free standing award48 as realistically the basis for upholding an Order 
made 20 or more years after separation’. The wife’s award was, therefore, discharged on the factual 
basis that she had failed to establish a causal link to the relationship. 
 
Both cases, therefore, suggest that if there is a long delay in bringing a claim then there must be a 
causal connection to make a claim based on needs.  This is consistent with dicta of Mostyn J in Rossi v 
Rossi49 in which the judge was concerned with an increase in the value of the parties’ assets since 
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separation. His judgment is, however, expressed in wider terms; it indicates that Baroness Hale’s 
speech in Miller; McFarlane ‘suggest[s] that in order to justify a needs based award identification 
ought to be made of a causal connection between the need and the marital relationship’.50  
 
Lord Wilson’s speech in Wyatt suggests that delay may act as a measure of remoteness in financial 
remedy applications: the delay may ‘reduce or even eliminate its provision for the applicant’. This is 
necessary to balance the competing concerns of ensuring that a spouse receives their entitlement 
and making sure that life after divorce is a realistic possibility.  As Thorpe LJ explained in a variation 
of maintenance case: 
 
‘it does not follow that the respondent is inevitably responsible financially for any 
established needs. He is not an insurer against all hazards… The prodigal former wife cannot 
hope to turn to a former husband in pursuit of a legal remedy, whatever may be her hope 
that he might out of charity come to her rescue.’51 
   
The need to balance these competing concerns was recognised by Lord Wilson himself in Wyatt52: 
 
‘Consistently with the potentially life-long obligations which attend a marriage, there is no 
time-limit for seeking orders for financial provision or property adjustment for the benefit of 
a spouse following divorce… Nevertheless it remains important to address its effect upon the 
respondent. In some cases, albeit not in the present, a respondent can show that he has 
assumed financial obligations or otherwise arranged his financial affairs in the belief that the 
applicant would make no claim against him and that he has done so in a way which, even if it 
were possible, it would not be reasonable for him to put into reverse...’53 
 
It is suggested that, in cases of delay, the approach of adopting a more restrictive treatment of claims 
based on temporal connections is the best way of balancing these competing interests.  This does not 
require abandoning the principled view, which suggests that such claims are legitimate at the point 
of divorce because of the interdependence inherent in marriage.  Rather, it recognises that the effect 
of delay is often that the parties have gone on to build a new life, assuming that they are free to start 
again.  At the point of divorce, the principled view aims for a result which is fair between the parties. 
It does not simply award the financially weaker spouse everything. It recognises that 
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interdependence may require meeting a wider range of needs than just those that can be traced 
causally to the relationship.  The objective of reaching a fair result is the same where there has been 
a delay.  The difference is that the fact of the delay may have created competing factors that point 
away from meeting only temporal claims. This means that the shift will be a gradual one and there is 
no specific time limit that will automatically preclude a temporal claim.  
 
By contrast, where delayed claims are based on a causal connection to the relationship, it is 
suggested, in line with the cases discussed above, that delay should not preclude a claim based on a 
causal connection. Unlike claims based on a temporal connection, which are concerned with fairness 
in the light of interdependence, causal claims, like sharing claims, are based on (a different form of) 
entitlement.  
 
Sharing cases 
 
Briers54 involved a wife’s claim for financial remedy brought 11 years after the end of the relationship 
(and 8 years after decree absolute had been pronounced). The wife had already received a payment 
of £150,000 from the husband. In addition, the former matrimonial home had been transferred into 
the wife’s sole name in return for her transferring her one share in the business to the husband (he 
held the other 99 shares). However, no financial remedy order had been made and there had been 
no financial disclosure. The Court of Appeal approved the first instance judge’s approach to delay 
which involved discounting the wife’s share of the assets (she received 27-30% of the total). It 
considered that delay ‘its explanation and effect, is an additional factor’.55  The Court of Appeal 
commented: 
 
‘I do not for a moment disagree with the propositions culled from first instance authorities 
that delay may reduce the fairness of an entitlement or that the diligence of a party in 
prosecuting a claim may affect the proportion of any share that party receives.  None of the 
first instance authorities can or does go so far as to suggest that the question of whether a 
non-matrimonial post-separation accrual can be shared is excluded by delay.  Each case is of 
course dependent on its facts.’56 
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On the facts of Briers,57 the post-separation increase in the value of the business was excluded from 
the sharing principle. Whilst this was treated as an ‘undivided matrimonial asset’58 because no 
financial remedy order had been made immediately on divorce, the wife had had no involvement in 
the business after separation.  
 
Delay can certainly lead to difficulties in quantifying a party’s entitlement under the sharing principle. 
In Hart v Hart,59 for example, the court struggled with the calculation of the husband’s pre-marital 
property after a 23-year relationship. The difficulties arose both from the problem of obtaining 
documentary evidence from so long ago, and from the husband’s poor disclosure. The Court of 
Appeal in Hart was unable to adopt a mathematical approach to the quantification of non-marital 
property and instead relied upon ‘a broad approach to determine the fairness of the proposed 
award’.60 On this basis, it upheld the decision at first instance which based the wife’s awards on her 
needs. The Court of Appeal considered that the judge must have taken into account ‘the principle 
that an award should be the greater of the amounts reached by application of the sharing principle 
and that reached by the application of the needs principle’.61 On the facts, it is hard to see how the 
judge could have taken this principle into account given the dearth of evidence about the extent of 
the non-marital property. Nevertheless, in cases where delay alone creates this problem, this 
approach to an applicant’s claim may be the fairest way to balance the interests of the two parties. 
On the facts of Hart, however, where many of the difficulties arose from the husband’s litigation 
misconduct, it seems wrong for the wife to ‘bear the burden of the factual uncertainty’.62 
 
Cases like these should not, however, be read as creating any kind of presumption that delay should 
reduce a party’s share of the marital assets or that any post-separation accrual is necessarily non-
matrimonial. The sharing principle as expressed in Miller; McFarlane63 is seen to derive from the idea 
of marriage as a partnership.  Baroness Hale talked about ‘sharing of the fruits of the matrimonial 
partnership’64 and Lord Nicholls of ‘an equal share of the assets of the partnership’.65  Thus, even a 
claim made years in the future is on the basis of entitlement. The equality of financial and non-
financial contributions66 means that both parties are viewed as having contributed equally to the 
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marital acquest, regardless of the nature of their contribution.  There is no reason that the passage of 
time alone should lessen the value of a non-financial contribution.  
 
Compensation? 
 
There is support for the view that causal claims survive delay on the facts of Wyatt67, albeit that the 
categorisation of the wife’s claim under the headings of needs, compensation and sharing is more 
complex. It was suggested that the wife’s best argument was based on her contributions to the 
marriage, which were not limited to those made prior to separation or even during the marriage: 
‘[h]er case is no more than that, for whatever reason, the heavy burden [of raising the children of the 
family] fell upon her and, in effect, upon her alone.’68 This seems to be a claim based on an 
entitlement, rather than need.  However, this rationale creates complexities on the facts of that case. 
At the point of divorce, there was no marital acquest for the wife to make a claim against; the wealth 
had all been generated afterwards.  Thus if the marital partnership ended at the point of divorce the 
wife's share would have been nothing: an equal share of nothing will always be nothing.  The court 
envisaged a relatively limited award for the wife: rather than £0.55m for a home and £1.35m for an 
income fund, ‘perhaps [the award] of an order which would enable her… to purchase a somewhat 
more comfortable, and mortgage-free, home for herself and her remaining dependants’.69 Miles 
questions the advantage of framing the claim in terms of entitlement, rather than need, suggesting: 
 
‘What the contribution-based conceptualization of the claim perhaps does is enable us to 
avoid the forensic impossibility of disentangling the various causes of the wife’s present 
needs, as the needs-based approach appears to require if only “relationship-generated” 
needs may be met.’70 
 
An alternative way of rationalising Wyatt would be on the basis of compensation: ‘finally paying back 
the wife for her input and economic drag that her child-care responsibilities may have had on her’.71 
These responsibilities, whilst post-dating the marriage, arise from the relationship: they are causally 
connected to it. Lord Wilson noted that the wife had suggested she might have a claim for 
compensation based on her care of the children inhibiting her ability to increase her earning 
                                                          
67 Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14. 
68 Ibid, [34]. 
69 Ibid, [36]. 
70 Harris-Short, Miles and George, Family Law: Text, cases, and materials (OUP, 2015), chapter 7 update, October 2017 
<http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/orc/resources/law/family/familytcm3e/resources/updates/harris_miles_update1017_ch07.
pdf> accessed 16 November 2017. 
71 Ibid. 
capacity.72 He did not specifically address whether this claim would succeed.  He did, however, 
indicate that a needs claim was unlikely to be successful on the facts and that the claim based on 
contributions ‘may prove to be much more powerful’.73  
 
It is suggested that, contrary to Lord Wilson's reasoning, it may be simpler to see this as a needs case 
based on a causal link to the marriage:  
 
'Causally, her claim was directly linked to the marriage and its consequences, including the 
post-divorce ramifications. She sought, and has now obtained, modest provision reflecting 
her post-divorce contributions as primary carer for the two children thereby vindicating 
needs created, and prolonged, by her post-divorce domestic contributions.'74 
 
Not only are needs claims ‘forensically easier’75 to run than those based on compensation but they 
avoid the complexity of using the entitlement-based language of contributions, associated with 
sharing claims, long after the end of the marital partnership which had itself generated no acquest to 
be shared. 
 
Temporal connections and the justification for spousal maintenance claims 
 
The concern in cases with a temporal, and not a causal link, seems to be with needs. For example, 
needs arising from a disability or as a result of caring for elderly parents.  The Supreme Court in 
Miller; McFarlane accepted that a needs claim could be met by either a capital or a maintenance 
award (or indeed some combination of the two). The idea of meeting needs through a spousal 
maintenance award in cases of delay provides further food for thought.  In Wyatt, the Supreme Court 
indicated that there might be a sufficient causal connection to found a capital claim but not a 
maintenance claim.  In Waudby the wife failed to establish a causal connection on the facts.  It, 
therefore, remains an open question whether in cases of delay it is possible to apply for spousal 
maintenance based on a temporal connection to the marriage.   
 
The basis for spousal maintenance, in so far as it is based on need, is itself contested. As I have 
argued, the pragmatist view, for example, considers that it should only be payable in respect of 
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claims that are causally connected to the relationship.76 Ira Ellman77 advanced an argument for 
alimony based on the interest in encouraging parties to share in marriage.78 The idea behind this 
theory, which bases the claimant spouse’s award on his or her lost earning capacity, is that the costs 
of traditional marriages differ for breadwinner and homemaker: 
 
‘It is a relationship in which the wife makes many initial investments of value only to her 
husband, investments a self-interested bargainer would only make in return for a long-term 
commitment.’79 
 
If society wants to encourage spouses to share in marriage, then alimony must provide redress for 
those who do so at their own expense.80 As Hale explains: 
 
‘it comes back to what we think marriage is and is for. Is it simply a private arrangement from 
which each can walk away when they want and without regard to the consequences for the 
other? Or is it a status in which we all have an interest? Do we want to encourage 
responsible families, in which people are able to compromise their place in the world outside 
the home for the sake of their partners, their children and their elderly or disabled relatives, 
and can be properly compensated for this if things go wrong?’81 
 
However, Ellman’s theory ignores the extent to which, when decisions are made on an economic 
basis, the decisions that make economic sense during the relationship would not make economic 
sense outside of it.  For example, Ellman suggests that: 
 
‘Whenever spouses have different earning capacities and want to plan rationally as a single 
economic unit, they will conclude that, where possible, they should shift economic sacrifices 
from the higher earning spouse to the lower earning spouse, because that shift will increase 
the income of the marital unit as a whole.’82  
 
On Ellman’s theory, it is the claimant spouse’s loss of earning capacity that is the key to the award 
they receive. However, the result of a decision such as the one outlined above is that the higher 
earner has benefitted from the relationship and the lower earner has lost a chance to improve their 
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own position. Someone who leaves school at 17 might, in the absence of the relationship, have gone 
back to complete school and go on to higher education.  Ellman recognises that calculations based on 
compensation are complex,83 but this approach ignores the extent to which the fates of the parties in 
a marriage are intertwined. An approach that ignores the income of the wealthier spouse may be 
unjust: whereas he or she has potentially had extra chances as a result of the relationship, the 
claimant spouse has potentially lost them. 
 
It is notable that compensation has not been favoured as a basis for spousal maintenance in practice, 
even by Ellman himself.84  Both the American Law Institute Principles and Canadian Spousal Support 
Advisory Guidelines, for example, adjust ‘disparity so as to reflect the extent of [merger over time], 
using time and childcare responsibilities as proxy measures of the extent to which the spouses have 
been interdependent.’85 It is interdependence, and not economic rationality, that more fully explains 
the decisions couples make in such relationships. As Ellman recognises, people ‘often sacrifice 
income to other values’.86 Financial provision at the point of divorce should reflect this.  The law 
should allow for spousal maintenance claims based on both causally and temporally connected 
claims at the point of divorce. However, consistently with the clean break principle, where claims are 
based on a temporal connection, they should be allowed on the basis of enabling a transition to 
independence. It must, however, be noted that this might ultimately mean a transition to reliance 
upon the state and/or a much reduced standard of living. In cases of delay, as in the case of capital 
claims, it will become increasingly difficult to mount a claim based on a temporal connection as other 
considerations come into play. In contrast, there is no reason that claims based on a causal 
connection (whether to meet needs or to compensate, and whether based on capital or income) 
should not survive into the future. 
 
Conclusion 
This article suggests a framework for the courts in considering financial remedy cases and, in 
particular, cases involving a delay in bringing financial remedy claims. It is suggested that the 
interdependence inherent in marriage justifies claims based on both a causal and a temporal 
connection to marriage. This does not, however, mean that a former spouse must act as insurer 
indefinitely. Over time, the balance of fairness to both parties means that temporal claims are less 
likely to succeed. Causally grounded claims, like sharing claims, more readily survive delay because 
they are based on a certain type of entitlement. 
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This framework may also be valuable when considering the forthcoming Supreme Court hearing in 
Mills v Mills,87 a variation of maintenance case. The issue for the court is whether the Court of Appeal 
was right to take the wife’s housing needs into account in increasing her periodical payments, in 
circumstances where she had received provision for these through the original capital settlement.88 
The source of the wife’s present unmet needs seems key: is it her own actions since the original 
financial remedy order, or a causal or temporal link to the relationship itself that has generated 
them? If the former, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal decision is wrong in principle. It is not 
sufficient justification for the husband to be required to meet any shortfall that ‘he could afford to 
pay periodical payments while maintaining his new family’.89 There must also be a principled reason, 
namely a causal or temporal connection to the relationship, for him to be required to use these 
means to make payments for his former wife. If the wife’s need arises from a temporal connection to 
the relationship, the question is what the passage of time since the original consent order in 2002 
means for the balance of fairness to both parties when considering whether the award should be 
increased. If the needs can instead be causally connected to the relationship (on the facts, this would 
likely be based on her role as the primary carer of the parties’ son) then delay itself should not 
prevent the wife’s claims from succeeding.  
 
On the facts, it appears that the source of the wife’s additional needs, resulting in the increase in her 
periodical payments by the Court of Appeal, may be the result of her own actions since the financial 
remedy order, rather than the relationship itself. The judge at first instance found that the wife had 
made a series of unwise investments in moving upmarket with an increased mortgage on several 
occasions, although there had not been any financial mismanagement on her part.  The more difficult 
question is whether her needs as found at the date of the 2002 order are still causally connected to 
the relationship or whether those needs continue to exist because of the wife’s subsequent actions.  
If the latter, then it is hard to see why the husband should continue to be held responsible for 
meeting them. 
 
Whilst consistency in reported case law and the underlying principles are important, it is also 
important to consider the way in which law operates in practice. Following the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, legal aid in family law cases has been very heavily reduced.  
This appears to have resulted in settlements increasingly being reached without legal advice.90 It 
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does, therefore, seem to be important to find out whether those settlements embody a similar view 
of marriage to that of the Supreme Court or whether the idea of marriage as a relationship between 
two autonomous individuals prevails.  It seems to be the case that courts at first instance favour a 
clean break approach. For example, Hilary Woodward found that notwithstanding statistically 
significant differences between the median income of wives and husbands (the latter earning more), 
spousal periodical payments and pension sharing orders were made in a minority of cases.91 It was 
also the case that wives tended to receive a greater share of the capital provision,92 but this 
research,93 and other studies,94 suggest that women tend to lose out more than men in income terms 
on separation, which perhaps suggests the increasing influence of the autonomous individual 
approach to marriage. These data do not, of course, capture the large percentage of cases in which 
no order is made at all.95 In cases where the parties do not have legal advice, legal norms around the 
equal value of domestic and financial contributions may carry even less weight.  Thus the ever-
reducing welfare state provision in England and Wales has the potential to leave the financially 
weaker spouse, and since that person is generally the children’s primary carer, any children, in a very 
precarious position. 
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